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I. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis ("GFC") resulted in a major rethink of the
rules and assumptions underpinning financial systems across the globe.
Attempts to identify the underlying causes are ongoing and the debate is
likely to continue for many years.' It is, however, clear that regulation in
many countries did not capture the risks that banks and other financial
institutions were exposed to and that the parameters of regulation were too
narrow. The emergence of a vast "shadow" financial sector meant that many
areas of finance across the globe were unregulated and accumulation of
harmful risk was undetected.2 In response, new approaches have been
considered and adopted in countries across the world with the key aim of
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This article is part of a research project funded by Melbourne Law School and the Centre for
International Finance and Regulation entitled "Financial System Regulation - is Australia's
'Twin Peaks' Approach a Model for China?" See Financial System Regulation - Is Australia's
"Twin Peaks" Approach a Model for China?, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
REGULATION (2015), http://www.cifr.edu.au/project/Australia-twin-peaks-approach
forChina and Asia.aspx (last visited June 29, 2016).
1. See, e.g., Rosa M Lastra & Geoffrey Wood, The Crisis of 2007-09: Nature, Causes, and
Reactions, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 531, 537-45 (2010). Lastra and Wood identify ten contributing
causes of the GFC, rather than relying on one cause as definitive. The factors they discuss are:
macro-economic imbalances, lax monetary policy, regulatory and supervisory failures, distorted
incentives leading to moral hazard, excessive reliance on securitization, unregulated and lightly
regulated companies, failures in corporate governance, bad lending and excessive leverage,
poorly structured incentive systems in financial institutions, and an unquestioning belief in the
efficient market theory. Despite such attempts at comprehensive analysis, there continues to be
strong debate amongst commentators about the origins of the GFC. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens,
M Ayhan K6se & Marco E Torrenes, The Global Financial Crisis: How Similar? How Diferent?
How Costly? 2 (Tusiad-Koc Univ. Econ. Research Forum, Working Paper No. 1011, Mar. 2010).
2. International Monetary Fund [IMF], The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say "No",
at 6, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/08 (May 18, 2010) [hereinafter IMF Staff Position Note];
see also Matthias Thiemann, In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis, 2 1
REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON., 1203, 1206-13 (2014). Thiemann provides a comprehensive
account of problems regarding shadow banking, cognitive capture, and structural constraints of
regulations in explaining the problems of the GFC. Id.
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providing regulators with the appropriate tools to detect and mitigate the
build-up of systemic risk.3
Whilst much of the reform focus aimed at addressing these problems has
been on improving substantive rules,4 there has also been recognition that
regulatory weaknesses failed to mitigate the effects of the crisis.5 This has
led to a renewed emphasis on improving the regulatory frameworks of many
financial systems. 6 In particular, there has been a push for an improvement
of the institutional environment that supports the role of regulators in acting
when most needed.: This reform program has been spurred on by the
perceived failure of many forms of financial regulatory framework in
preventing the problems that led to the GFC.8 Although the apparent poor
3. See FINANcIAL SERVICEs AUTHORITY, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the
Global Banking Crisis 51-53 (2009) [hereinafter The Turner Review].
4. These systemic faults have led to international efforts to improve funding requirements of
banks and other important financial institutions in the hope that the financial sector will be
better equipped in the future to deal with crises. See, e.g., G20 Pittsburgh Summit 2009,
Pittsburg, Pa., U.S., Sept. 24-25, 2009, Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 25,
2009). Internationally, these efforts have resulted in the negotiation of the Basel III Accord,
which has sought to strengthen capital requirements of major international banks and has
imposed liquidity and leverage requirements in addition to the funding requirements of
internationally active banks. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel IlL A Global
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENT 6-7 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Ross Levine, The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent
Crisis 3-8 (Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper No. 329, Nov. 2010) (setting out
four examples that show systemic failure of financial regulation to be one of the key reasons for
destabilisation of the global financial system); see also R Michael Gadbaw, Systematic Regulation of
Global Trade and Finance: A Tale of Two Systems, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 551, 554-57 (2010) (noting
that regulators missed many factors contributing to the GFC because they missed the systemic
nature of the financial system).
6. In this paper, the term "regulatory" is a reference to both regulation and supervision
unless otherwise expressly stated. Financial regulation refers to the processes in place for "rule-
making;" whereas, "financial supervision" refers to the structures in place to allow supervisors to
monitor and enforce these rules. Luis Garicano & Rosa M Lastra, Towards a New Architecture
for Financial Stability: Seven Principles, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 597, 599 (2010); IMF Staff Position
Note, supra note 2, at 6; Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Financial Supervision After
the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve, Speech at 54th Economic Conference, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20091023a.htm.
7. IMF Staff Position Note, supra note 2, at 5.
8. Criticism to varying degrees has been made of many financial regulatory models, including
the fragmented institutional architectures, which divide regulatory authority on the basis of the
different institutions within the finance sector (like the traditional approach in the United States
of America (USA)); unitary architectures, which place all financial regulatory authority into one
regulatory agency (like the previous approach in the United Kingdom(UK)); and those
countries that have opted for what has come to be known as a "Twin Peaks" model of regulatory
architecture, which separates regulatory authority between prudential regulation and market
conduct regulation. See Garicano & Lastra, supra note 6, at 599; see also Sheila C Bair, The Case
Against a Super Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/
opinion/0lbair.html?_r=0>.
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performance of these frameworks has lent support to theories asserting that
the particular form of regulatory institutional infrastructure has little to do
with the ability of states to prevent or mitigate the effects of financial
catastrophe,9 it is generally accepted that institutional design remains
integral in combating financial crises.1o
Support for the continued importance of institutional design in financial
stability has often looked to the relatively positive performance during the
GFC of some countries, including Australia," using the so-called Twin
Peaks model of financial infrastructure ("Twin Peaks Model").12 This has led
several countries hardest hit by the GFC to consider adopting various forms
of the Twin Peaks Model when introducing their own reforms, in the hope
that this would address some of the regulatory concerns identified during the
GFC.13 Australian reformers, relying on positive analysis of the Twin Peaks
9. For example, Steve Keen has been critical of claims that the Australian institutional
structure played an important part in Australia's good performance during the GFC, instead
claiming that the major difference between countries that were more directly affected by the
GFC than Australia is a difference in the build-up of private debt, and Keen does not agree with
the analysis that attributes Australia's good performance during the GFC to factors such as the
regulatory regime. Steve Keen, Australia versus the US and UK: the Kangaroo Economy, in
BANKING SYSTEMS IN THE CRISIS: THE FACES OF LIBERAL CAPITALISM 193, 210-16 (Suzanne
J. Konzelmann & Marc Fovargue-Davies eds., 2013); see also Bair, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Konzelmann & Marc Fovargue-Davies, Australia: Economic
Liberalization and Financialization - An Introduction, in BANKING SYSTEMS IN THE CRISIS: THE
FACES OF LIBERAL CAPITALISM 186, 189-91 (Routledge 2013) (noting positively the role of
regulation when discussing the difference between Australia's performance to other countries
during the GFC); see also Kim Hawtrey, The Global Credit Crisis: Why Have Australian Banks Been
so Remarkably Resilient?, 16 AGENDA 95, 110-11 (2009); Jennifer Hill, Why did Australia fare so
well in the global financial crisis?, in THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS 203 (Eilis Ferran, Niamh Maloney, Jennifer Hill and John Coffee Jr eds., Cambridge
University Press 2012); Donato Masciandaro, Roasaria Vega Pansini & Marc Quintyn, The
Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter? 4 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/1 1/261, Nov.
2011); Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States,
the United Kingdom and Australia, 15 VILL. L. REv. 509, 574-75 (2010).
11. Hawtrey, supra note 10, at 110. See also Tony D'Aloisio, Chairman, Austl. Sec. and Invs.
Comm'n, "Twin Peaks": A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, Speech at Securities &
Derivatives Industry Association 12th Annual Conference, Sydney (May 29, 2009), available at
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1346630/sdia-speech-chairman-May-09.pdf (discussing
some of the effects of the GFC on Australia).
12. This form of financial regulation was first recommended by Michael Taylor. Michael
Taylor, "TwIN PEAKs": A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (Centre for the
Study of Financial Innovation, London, Dec. 1995); see also Michael W. Taylor, The Road From
"Twin Peaks" - And the Way Back, 16 CoNN. INS. L.J. 61 (2009) (reviewing the positive aspects
of Twin Peaks as compared to the previous much maligned unitary model adopted in the UK
leading up to the GFC); see, e.g., Alex Holevas, Twin Peaks: The Envy of the World, WEALTH
PROF'L (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.wealthprofessional.com.au/news/twin-peaks-the-envy-of-
the-world-122530.aspx (referencing Australia as the "envy of the world").
13. Even countries like the USA, which have for a long time argued that the complexity of the
financial system made it difficult to streamline the financial regulatory system, have flirted with
the idea of dividing prudential from market conduct regulation (although a market stability
authority was also proposed along with the twin peaks bodies). See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
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Model, have been less inclined to engage in a review that would disturb the
current status quo for fear of negatively altering what has generally been
considered an important factor in Australia's relative successful navigation of
the GFC.14
But, whilst the Australian financial regulatory framework surely deserves
some of the praise that it has received, Australian reformers should continue
to explore potential improvements to the financial regulatory system to
ensure that the system will be best positioned to meet the challenges of the
evolving financial system. 5 In this regard, several improvements in the
regulatory framework have been suggested by the recent Financial System
Inquiry in Australia (FSI)16 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
its assessment of Australia.'7 But, these recommendations were made with
little reference to the way in which the Australian financial regulatory
framework had coped in the past with financial crises and challenges in
TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANciAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 136-80
(2008); Governor Daniel K. Tarullo of the US Federal Reserve has stated in arguing for
structural reforms that "the aims and scope of prudential regulation have been fundamentally
redefined since the financial crisis." Daniel K. Tarullo, Daniel K. Tarullo, Rethinking the Aims
of Prudential Regulation, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure
Conference (May 8, 2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20140508a.htm. Ultimately, the Treasury Blueprint was not adopted and instead, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173;
commonly referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act) was signed into federal law by President Barack
Obama on July 21, 2010. See Renee M. Jones, Back to Basics: Why Financial Regulatory Overhaul is
Overrated, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 391, 398-400 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act is based
on a plan proposed by President Obama in 2009 and amongst other things, provides additional
powers to the Federal Reserve to act as a systemic risk regulator and abolishes the Office of
Thrift Supervision. See id. In the UK, however, there was much more support for regulatory
reform in light of the significant blame attributed to what was referred to as the tripartite
system, consisting of the Bank of England; the Financial Stability Authority; and the Treasury
Department, for not being able to identify the problems associated with the GFC. George
Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Lord's Mayor Dinner for Bankers and
Merchants in the City of London Mansion House (June 16, 2010), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech736.pdf. This led to
the implementation in the UK of a Twin Peaks model with prudential and market conduct
regulation being assigned to separate regulators. See id.
14. See infra Part II B.
15. The recent Financial System Inquiry in Australia itself recognised that it would be
imprudent to think that conditions that cushioned Australia during GFC will exist in the future
and that Australia should therefore heed the lessons learned by others during the GFC. FIN.
Sys. INQUIRY, FINANCIAL SYSTEM INQUIRY FINAL REPORT 21 (2014) [hereinafter FSI Final
Report]. The FSI Final report provides a detailed discussion of the evolving nature of the
Australian financial system. Id. at xiv.
16. Id. at 233-261.
17. IMF, Australia: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, at 6, IMF
Country Report No 12/308 (November 2012) [hereinafter IMF FSAP] ("[t]here is some room
for improvement in certain areas of supervision, such as further enhancing APRA's formal on-
site supervisory review of banks' liquidity risk management. The adequacy and stability of
ASIC's funding is crucial for it to carry out proactive supervision, so it is important to increase
its core funding.").
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Australia.'s Viewing the framework through an historic lens may help
Australia avoid a repeat of the series of corporate collapses in the early 2000s
that followed many years of sustained growth in Australia and Australia's
strong performance during the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s.19
This has become an increasingly important task in light of the
interconnected nature of modern day global finance, where risks are likely to
emanate from a multitude of sources that are difficult to identify.20 As a
consequence, regulators across the world have been given a more prominent
role when it comes to detecting and mitigating systemic risk.21
This paper examines how the Twin Peaks Model in Australia has
responded to financial collapses and challenges since its implementation.22
Although isolated corporate collapses do not necessarily indicate regulatory
failure,23 it is useful, in light of the wholesale rethink that is taking place after
an event such as the GFC and the increased move towards some form of the
18. ASIC has acknowledged the value of looking to past crises in learning lessons. See, e.g.,
John Price, Comm'r, Austl. Sec. and Invs. Comm'n, The Biggest Changes to the Financial
System Since the Wallis Inquiry, Speech at the Corporate Governance Forum (June 3, 2014),
available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/speeches/biggest-changes-to-the-
financial-system-since-the-wallis-inquiry/.
19. Jean J du Plessis, Reverberations after the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate
Collapses: The Role of ASIC, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 225, 229 (2003).
20. Andrew Haldane has discussed the increasingly interconnected nature of the financial
system in discussing whether the financial system is a complex adaptive system. Andrew G.
Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech at
the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf. See
also CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: How TRADE ALLIANCES, Sor LAW, AND FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING ARE DEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 105, 49 (2014) (noting that as
international trade linkages have deepened with advances in technology so have financial ties.
As a result, capital now flows across borders even more freely than goods and services).
21. For example, the G20 committed early on to the need to "reshape our regulatory systems
so that our authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks." G20
London Summit 2009, Apr. 2, 2009, London Summit - Leaders' Statement (Apr. 2, 2009). In
response to a call by the G20 to expand on this need, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), IMF,
and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) produced a report, which looked at three broad
issues: "(i) advances in the identification and monitoring of systemic financial risk; (ii) the
designation and calibration of instruments for macroprudential purposes; and (iii) building
institutional and governance arrangements in the domestic and regional context."' FIN.
STABILITY BD., INT'L MONETARY FUND, & BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY TOOLS AND FRAMEWORK: PROGRESS REPORT To G20 3 (2011).
22. The system was introduced in 1998 by the Howard government in response to the
Financial System Inquiry Final Report ("Wallis Report"). FIN. Sys. INQUIRY, FINANCIAL
SYSTEM INQUIRY FINAL REPORT (2014) [hereinafter Wallis Report]; see Press Release, Hon.
Peter Costello, Treasurer, Reform of the Australian Fin. Sys. (Sept. 2, 1997), available at http://
fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/Publiclnformation/PressReleases/PR020997.asp (the Howard
government's response to the Wallis Report).
23. See, e.g., PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORP. AND FIN. SERV., PARLIAMENT OF
AUSTL, INQUIRY INTO FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA: FINAL REPORT 50
(2009) [hereinafter Financial Products and Services Inquiry Report]. The Inquiry notes that it is
not necessarily appropriate to recommend reform in response to a particular collapse or event
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Twin Peaks Model of regulation internationally in response to the GFC, to
consider whether these experiences suggest ongoing regulatory challenges.24
By exploring these common themes in financial regulation by reference to
various financial collapses and challenges, we provide an indication of where,
even in the absence of a major financial crisis,25 Australia might focus its
reform agenda and improve the current financial regulatory framework.
This may in turn assist reformers in foreign jurisdictions looking to the Twin
Peaks Model to address regulatory problems that they identified during the
GFC. We argue that Australia's experience with financial collapses over the
past fifteen years indicates continuing challenges for regulators in
coordinating regulatory functions and resolving issues concerning the nature
and scope of functions of each regulator (what we will refer to as "border
challenges").26
The structure of the paper is as follows. Part II provides a brief
description of the current Australian Twin Peaks Model and reviews
because isolated corporate failures, no matter how painful their impact for those caught up in
them, are not necessarily indicative of, or caused by, regulatory failure. Id.
24. This analysis is important considering the continued contested reasons put forward for
Australia's successful navigation through the GFC. For example, factors that have been
identified as contributing to Australia's success during the GFC include the underwriting
standards and the business models adopted by most Australian lenders, which meant that many
lenders were not tempted to engage in the residential sub-prime lending that was controversial
overseas. See John Trowbridge, The Regulatory Environment - A Brief Tour, Speech at the
National Insurance Brokers Association Conference, Sydney (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://
www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/Documents/NIBA-Sep-2009.pdf. Another oft cited reason for
Australia's successful navigation through the GFC was China's demand for Australian resources
during the GFC. See, e.g., Reserve Bank of Austl., The Global Financial Crisis And its Impact on
Australia, YEARBOOK AUSTL., 2009-10 (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.abs.gov.au/
AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1301.OChapter27092009%E2% 80%9310; David Alexander,
How Australia Weathered the Global Financial Crisis While Europe Failed, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
29, 2013, 2:53 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/28/australia-
global-economic-crisis; Guy Debelle, Assistant Governor, Fin. Mkts., Some Effects of the
Global Financial Crisis on Australian Financial Markets, Speech at the Finance Professionals
Forum, Sydney (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2009/sp-ag-
310309.html.
25. Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Comm'n, Structural Reform Australian-Style:
Lessons for Others, Speech to the IMF, World Bank, and OECD 15 (May 2005), available at
http://www.pc.gov.au/news-media/speeches/cs20050601/cs20050601.pdf. In discussing the
benefits of the Australian approach to regulatory reform, Banks notes that Australia has often
acted proactively rather than reacting to crises as is typical in other industrialised countries:
as Mancur Olsen has shown, it can take a crisis to pave the way for wide-ranging
reform. This has indeed been the precursor to reform in a number of developed
and developing countries (often under the 'guidance' of the Fund or World Bank).
This was not the case in Australia, although public perception of a looming crisis in
the absence of reform has at times been actively promoted by the government -
most famously in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested that Australia risked
becoming a "banana republic." Id.
26. We have adapted the term "border problems" used by Goodhart and Lastra. See Charles
A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 705 (2010).
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arguments that have been made in support of the model. Part III considers
various financial collapses in Australia over the past 15 years that have
revealed the difficulties in arranging adequate coordination mechanisms
between regulators and establishing clear borders between Australia's
regulators as was the original intention of the Twin Peaks Model. Part IV
concludes and provides a summary of the key challenges.
II. The Australian Financial Regulatory Architecture: A Brief
Overview
A. TwiN PEAKS MODEL
Australia's financial regulatory framework centres on the two institutions
that provide the "Twin Peaks" element to the model.27 These peaks have
been created to separate the market conduct and consumer protection
authority of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
from the prudential regulatory responsibilities of the Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (APRA).28 The emphasis on financial regulation is
therefore on functional regulation, rather than on the legal form or activities
carried out by the institutions that are regulated. The Wallis Inquiry
envisaged that both regulatory bodies would have operational autonomy to
pursue their legislated objectives in the most efficient and cost-effective
manner possible.29 Although the Wallis Inquiry recommended that APRA
and ASIC should finance their operational costs through levies upon the
institutions they supervise, this recommendation was only taken up by the
government in relation to APRA and not ASIC.30 This has meant that
27. But see MINTER ELLISON, SUBMISSION TO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM INQUIRY 6-7 (2014).
In criticising the number of regulators with involvement in the Australian financial system,
Minter Ellison notes that although the Australian system is usually referred to as the Twin Peaks
system, financial institutions are in fact subject to regulation by several more regulators. Id.
These include the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission, the Australian Taxation
Office, the Australian Transactions and Reports and Analysis Centre, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Office of the Australian Information Commission. Id.
28. See A. Godwin & I. Ramsay, Twin peaks - the legal and regulatory anatomy of Australia's
system offinancial regulation, 26 JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 240-
68 (2015) (a comprehensive discussion of the Twin Peaks Model).
29. Wallis Report, supra note 22, at 531-32.
30. See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) div 1, pt 5 (Austl.) (describing
APRA's funding arrangements). In its submission to the FSI, ASIC sets out in detail the current
problems with its funding arrangements including the following comments:
ASIC is largely funded by government appropriation. Variance in funding from
year to year exacerbates the uncertainty inherent in the budget process and results
in inefficiencies in the allocation of ASIC's resources to achieve regulatory
outcomes.... ASIC's current funding model was criticised by the Financial Stability
Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 2012. The
IMF expressed concerns about the government-funded models of Australia, the
United States, Japan and Argentina. They were concerned about a lack of stable
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funding continues to be a primary concern for ASIC as its regulatory
authority is increasingly expanded.
A third, unofficial "pillar" of the Australian financial regulatory framework
is Australia's central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). The Wallis
Inquiry debated the possibility of allocating prudential regulatory authority
to the RBA as is common in many other systems similar to the Twin Peaks
Model,3' but, ultimately, the Wallis Inquiry decided that the responsibility
for prudential regulation should be allocated to an independent regulatory
authority.32 The RBA continues, however, to play an important role in
financial regulation as the lender of last resort and the body with primary
responsibility for ensuring system stability, including that of the payments
system.33
Finally, the division of responsibilities between financial regulators in
Australia on a functional basis makes it necessary to have strong
coordination mechanisms. The Australian financial regulatory framework
relies on informal bilateral coordination mechanisms,34 as well as the
Council of Financial Regulators (CFR), an informal organisation with no
regulatory functions, consisting of representatives from the RBA, APRA,
ASIC and the Treasury Department and whose purpose it is to oversee inter-
agency coordination31
funding, an inability to commit resources to longer term projects and weaknesses in
proactive supervision.
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, FINANCIAL SYSTEM INQUIRY:
SUBMISSION BY THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION 52-55 (2014).
ASIC suggests that this be rectified through adoption of a user pays funding model based on a
cost recovery. Id. at 55-59. The Australian government is currently undertaking a process of
consultation in respect of the proposed adoption of an industry funding model for ASIC.
Australian Government, Proposed Industry Funding Model for the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (Consultation Paper, Aug. 2015).
31. See, e.g., Andrew Godwin & Andrew Schmulow, The Financial Sector Regulation Bill in
South Africa: Lessons from Australia, 132 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL, 756-68 (2015)
(providing a discussion on the relationship between the prudential authority and central bank
and whether prudential authority should be housed within the central bank).
32. The Wallis Report sets out both the reasons for separation of prudential regulation from
the RBA as well as arguments in favour of placing prudential regulatory authority with the RBA.
Wallis Report, supra note 22, at 3 13-17.
33. Id. at 361-415.
34. ASIC provides a list of MoUs with other agencies, including the RBA and APRA. Other
Regulators and Organisations, AUSTL. SEC. AND INVS. COMM'N, http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/
what-we-do/our-role/other-regulators-and-organisations/ (last visited June 2016). APRA
similarly has a website containing its Memoranda of Understanding. Memoranda of
Understanding and Letters of Arrangement, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., http://
www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/ArrangementsandMoUs.aspx (last visited June 2016).
35. See Submission to the Financial System Inquiry, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL. 66 (March 2014),
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Reser-ve-Bank ofAustralia.pdf. [hereinafter RBA Submission to
the FSI]. See also About the CFR, COUNCIL OF FIN. REGULATORS, http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-
cfr/ (last visited June 27, 2016); Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management:
Between the Members of the Council of Financial Regulators, COUNCIL OF FIN. REGULATORS (Sept.
18, 2008), http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-cfr/mou/.
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B. SUPPORT FOR THE TwIN PEAKS MODEL
The Twin Peaks Model described in the above sections has generally been
viewed as providing Australia with a strong regulatory foundation from
which it successfully navigated the GFC. The FSI, whilst recognising that
there was room to improve the Australian financial system's resilience,
efficiency and fair treatment for market participants, found that "[a]lthough
Australia was not immune to the effects of the GFC, the financial system and
institutional framework held up well compared with many financial systems
elsewhere in the world. In particular, Australia's regulatory frameworks
proved robust during this period."36
Such statements suggest a belief that the Twin Peaks Model played at least
some part in staving off the worst effects of the GFC and may have lent
support for the wider use of the Twin Peaks Model of regulation since the
GFC. The fact that Australia's regulatory framework was found to be robust
during the GFC was also one of the main reasons why the FSI was reluctant
to make changes that would alter the current financial framework37
The generally positive assessment of Australia's financial regulatory
approach has also received strong backing from international financial
authorities such as the IMF, which in its most recent Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP) for Australia found that "[t]he principles-based
and outcome-oriented supervisory approach of APRA is effective, with
notable strengths in risk analyses embedded in the PAIRS [Profitability and
Impact Rating System] and SOARS [Supervisory Oversight and Response
System] system, industry-wide risk assessments, and a focus on bank boards'
36. FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 13.
37. Id. at 233-34. The FSI did not support the view that the CFR should be given a more
formal role in coordination because it was felt that this would change the Australian financial
regulatory framework. For arguments in support of a more formal role, see Second Submission to
the Financial System Inquiry, WESTPAC BANKING CORP. 110 (August 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/
files/2014/08/Westpac.pdf. Westpac states that the FSI should consider recommending an
increase in the role, transparency and external accountability mechanisms of the CFR through
measures including formalisation of its role within statute. Id. This view was supported by other
submitters such as KPMG which states that the "role, transparency and accountability of the
CFR would be strengthened if it were given statutory recognition." Submission: Financial System
Inquiry, KPMG 5 (Mar. 31, 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/KPMG.pdf. In its second
round submission, however, APRA notes that a more formalised approach of coordination by
giving CFR powers and functions defined in legislation would substantially risk blurring
regulators' existing responsibilities and powers and muddying their accountabilities. Financial
System Inquiry: Response to the Interim Report, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY
72 (Aug. 26, 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/08/APRA_2.pdf. Perhaps not surprisingly, these
views were echoed by other regulators, such as the RBA. See Supplementary Submission to the
Financial System Inquiry, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL. 13-14 (Aug. 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/
2014/08/RBA.pdf. Support for the regulators' approach was provided by submitters such as
Minter Ellison, who suggested that the current role of the CFR did not need to be formalised
through legislation. See Submission on the Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, MINTER
ELLISON 7 (Aug. 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/09/MinterEllison.pdf.
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responsibility for risk management. ASIC is also a highly regarded enforcer
of market regulation."38
Australia's financial regulators have, on the back of these official
endorsements, pointed out that Australia's financial regulatory model played
a significant part in Australia's positive performance during the GFC.39
III. The Challenges Revealed by Australia's Experience of
Financial Collapses
The generally positive reviews of the Australian financial regulatory
framework tend mainly to consider Australia's performance in terms of
international best practice standards.40 When viewed in this light, the
theoretical basis of the system appears sound. Practical challenges appear,
however, when the performance of financial regulation over the past fifteen
years in response to various financial collapses is examined.4' These events
38. IMF FSAP, supra note 17 (as with the FSI Final Report, the IMF found that there was
room for improvement in the regulatory approach, with particular emphasis placed on
enhancing APRA's formal on-site supervisory review of banks' liquidity risk management and
increasing ASIC's core funding so that it can carry out proactive supervision). The OECD has
similarly endorsed the twin peaks model of financial regulation and has held up Australia as an
example of how this model provides a sound basis for supervision. See The Financial Crisis:
Reform and Exit Strategies, OECD 18 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/
43091457.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Malcom Edey, Assistant Governor, Fin. Mkts., Reflections on the Financial
Crisis: Address to CFO Summit, Gold Coast (16 March 2014), available at http://
www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2014/sp-ag-160314.html.Edey states that in addition to Australia
being fortunate to have high demand for mineral resources leading up to and during the GFC
and possessing a sound monetary and fiscal framework:
At least as important as all this is that Australia was well served by its prudential
regulatory framework. The post-Wallis framework that was put in place in 1998
established APRA as the integrated prudential regulator, affirmed the financial
stability role of the RBA and set up the Council of Financial Regulators to ensure
appropriate coordination among the regulatory agencies. Under APRA's
leadership, Australian banks were held to much higher standards of resilience than
many of their international counterparts. The banks remained profitable and well
capitalised. Loan performance did deteriorate during the crisis period, but nowhere
near as much as it did in the North Atlantic economies.
Id.
40. The BCBS, with its Core Principles for Banking Supervision and IOSCO, with its
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, provide guidance to national regulations in
banking and securities. See Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION (Sept. 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf [hereinafter BCBS
Core Principles]; see also Objectives and PHnciples of Sec. Regulation, INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS
(June 2010), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. These standards
are in turn used by the IMF and the World Bank in their FSAP assessments. There have been
critical examinations of the FSAP process, which uses these principles. See, e.g., Brummer, supra
note 20, at 104-5.
41. See, e.g., Anona Armstrong & Ronald Francis, Loss of Integrity: The True Failure of the
Corporate Sector, 3 J. OF Bus. Sys., GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 3 (2008) (discussing several
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illustrate that in spite of the relative effectiveness of the Australian
regulatory framework, Australian regulators continue, at times, to face
challenges in executing their regulatory functions.
These financial collapses reveal that Australian regulators encounter
regulatory challenges in two important areas. First, there is the challenge of
providing the effective coordination mechanisms required of a multi-agency
system. Second, although the Twin Peaks Model was meant to assist
regulators in delineating their regulatory objectives, they have in practice
encountered several challenges as increased integration has led to an overlap
between the functions and expected roles of the regulators. As a result, the
clear divisions established between regulators when the Twin Peaks Model
was first adopted are sometimes difficult to maintain. This has also made it
more difficult to determine what tools should be available to regulators to
carry out their functions.
The analysis in the remainder of Part III considers various examples that
illustrate these challenges. In determining which collapses and regulatory
challenges to examine, we have been guided by those instances where a
financial collapse or regulatory challenge has been the subject of official
review. The official analysis of "what went wrong" allows us to ascertain
whether it was broadly accepted that there were regulatory failings in
responding to a particular collapse. In the absence of further scrutiny of the
financial regulatory system in Australia, these official accounts of regulatory
failings provide the most reliable basis for such an analysis. This approach
does have several drawbacks, including the tendency noted earlier to take an
individual crisis as indicative of broader regulatory failings that do not
actually exist.42 We have attempted to protect against this tendency by
reviewing several collapses, cutting across different sectors of the financial
market, to determine whether any common themes arise.
A. COORDINATION CHALLENGES
It is broadly recognised that regulatory frameworks that divide authority
between multiple agencies require strong coordination mechanisms to
ensure that issues needing regulatory oversight do not fall through the
gaps.43 These coordination mechanisms have taken on added significance
with the recognition that regulation should take account of systemic risk and
collapses of financial institutions amongst a broader analysis of corporate collapses); see also
Evan Jones, The Crisis and the Australian Financial Sector, 64J. oF AUSTL. POL. ECON. 91 (2009)
(providing a summary of a range of financial sector collapses and scandals that have beset
Australia). Jones also laments the fact that Australia's performance during the GFC appears to
have led to complacency and optimism, especially in official circles, despite evidence of a string
of financial failures. Evan Jones, The Crisis and the Australian Financial Sector, 64 J. or AUSTL.
POL. EcON. 91 (2009). Jones further notes that consideration of financial failures has to date
largely focused on isolated instances and even then has been predominantly the concern of
journalists. Id.
42. See Financial Products & Services Inquiry Report, supra note 23, at 50.
43. See, e.g., BCBS Core Principles, supra note 40, at 24 et seq.
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macroprudential concerns to address the integrated nature of the financial
system.44 As noted in Part II, Australia relies primarily on informal bilateral
arrangements between each of its main financial regulators as well as the
informal CFR process to facilitate coordination amongst the most important
Australian financial regulators. In its submission to the FSI, the RBA argued
against formalising the coordination mechanism of the CFR because
"formalising the CFR with explicit responsibilities and policy tools would
involve transferring agency constituent powers to the CFR, with the risk of
blurring lines of responsibility that to date have worked well."45 It is not
readily apparent why this would blur lines of responsibility, but the
statement presents a clear message that in the view of Australia's regulators,
formalising coordination mechanisms may do more harm than good.46 The
rest of this section examines whether Australia's experience with the
financial collapses considered in the following section supports the positive
view of informal coordination mechanisms in dealing with the division of
regulatory authority amongst the regulators.
1. HIH Collapse: The First Coordination Test for the Australian Twin
Peaks Model
The first and perhaps still the most notable instance of insufficient
coordination between Australia's financial regulators is provided in the
collapse of HIH Insurance ("HIH").47 A Royal Commission ("HIH Royal
44. See, e.g., Luis I. Jicome & Erlend W. Nier, Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole,
INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm
(last visited June 27, 2016). When discussing regulatory approaches that ensure a system-wide
approach Jicome and Nier note that:
The arrangements should foster effective identification of developing risks; provide
strong incentives to take timely and effective action to counter those risks; and
facilitate coordination across policies that affect systemic risk (citations omitted).
To achieve these goals, the setup should avoid complex and excessively
fragmented structures. If there are many players, institutional silos and rivalries can
hinder risk identification and mitigation of systemic risk, undermining the
effectiveness of macroprudential policies.
Id.
45. RBA Submission to the FSI, supra note 35, at 67.
46. As a representative of one of the regulators noted during interviews conducted by the
authors, "it is not possible to rely on legislation to enforce regulatory coordination .... over-
prescription or formalisation can stifle coordination." In addition, it was suggested that the
flexible and informal nature of the framework of coordination had given rise to a "culture of
coordination" in which there was informal "give and take" between the regulators and an
intuitive sense as to which agency should be the lead agency in certain areas. This reduced the
risk of turf warfare or territory-grabbing.
47. The HIH collapse refers to the financial collapse of the HIH Group in March 2001. The
collapse was found to be caused primarily by malfeasance 'borne of a misconceived desire to
paper over the ever-widening cracks that were appearing in the edifice that was HIH.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., THE FAILURE OF HIH INSURANCE xvi (2003) [hereinafter HIH
Royal Commission Report]. The HIH Royal Commission found that a deficiency of several billion
dollars had arisen because claims arising from insured events in previous years were far greater
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Commission"), when looking at what factors contributed to the collapse of
what was Australia's second largest insurance provider, referred to serious
coordination deficiencies between APRA and ASIC.48 The HIH Royal
Commission noted that "[t]he evidence indicated there were difficulties in
the relationship between ASIC and APRA. These arose principally from the
fact that the two organisations took on overlapping and unclearly delineated
roles from June 1998 in relation to financial services providers."49
Although the HIH Royal Commission found that the regulators did not
cause the collapse of HIH,50 it found that the collapse had shown existing
coordination measures fell short of what was expected of Australia's financial
regulators.' The HIH Royal Commission went on to find that differences
in regulatory approach, including differences in approach to sharing
information, meant that there were deficiencies in information-exchange on
APRA's part and ASIC was therefore less informed of issues relating to HIH
than it should have been.52
As a result of these limitations, the HIH Royal Commission
recommended that legislative amendments be made to ensure that the
regulators would in future cooperate more effectively.53 In response to this
recommendation, section 10A of the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority Act 1998 (Cth) was inserted, to express the intention of Parliament
that APRA, "in performing and exercising its functions and powers,
cooperat[e] with other financial sector supervisory agencies."54 In addition,
APRA and ASIC amended their Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU")
in 2004 to strengthen cooperation between the two organisations.55
than the company had provided for. Id. Overextension into unfamiliar markets, such as the
purchase of FAI in the USA, also contributed to the collapse. Id.
48. Id. at 466.
49. Id.
50. See id. at xvii.
51. See id. at 466.
52. See id. at 466-67 (In response to the collapse, ASIC claimed that it was APRA's relaxed
regulatory approach that caused the difference in regulatory style and difficulties with
information exchange).
53. The HIH Royal Commission noted that "[t]he commitment by both APRA and ASIC to
cooperation and full and open exchange of information needs to be reinforced.
Communications and exchanges should be undertaken in a systematic way (through both formal
and informal means) and based on clear protocols." Id. at 224. Refer to the discussion in Part
IIIB on how financial integration has potentially exacerbated problems associated with
regulatory overlap.
54. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (1998) (Cth) s 10A, https://
www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014C00500.
55. This amendment was made in response to recommendation 31 of the HIH Royal
Commission. See HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note 47, at 225. The Current version of
the MoU provides as its objective in clause 1.1: "[t] his memorandum of understanding (MOU)
sets out a framework for cooperation between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (the agencies) in
areas of common interest where co-operation is essential for the effective and efficient
performance of their respective financial regulation functions." Australian Prudential
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2. Trio Capital Collapse: An Ongoing Problem of Coordination
These improvements to the coordination framework between APRA and
ASIC, however, may not have assisted the regulators in anticipating and
dealing with the collapse of Trio Capital.56 The Inquiry into the collapse of
Trio Capital ("Trio Capital Inquiry") found once again that APRA and
ASIC, even following the improvements made after the HIH collapse, had
not created a coordination framework that would help them identify the
fraud taking place in Trio Capital before its collapse57 The Inquiry noted
that between 2008 and 2009, Trio Capital was not providing APRA with
information requested on the value of certain assets and APRA, as was the
case with HIH, did not communicate this information to ASIC.58
Consequently, when ASIC commenced investigation of the relevant Trio
Capital hedge funds in June 2009, it was not aware that Trio Capital had not
been providing APRA with basic facts about the existence of assets within its
portfolio and their value.59
APRA and ASIC once again responded to these criticisms by committing
to improve coordination efforts through implementation of measures aimed
at enhancing exchange of information between formal meetings, increasing
presentations to each other's staff to clarify the role of each agency,
developing guidance notes to assist staff identify matters relevant to the
other agency, and utilising secondments to increase the familiarity of staff
members with the other agency. 60
It is difficult to determine at this early stage whether these efforts will
overcome coordination challenges such as those experienced in the HIH
collapse and the Trio Capital collapse. But, both examples raise a further
Regulation Authority and Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Memorandum of
Understanding between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Australian Securities
& Investments Commission cl. 1.1 (May 18, 2010), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340876/
MOU-APRA-and-ASIC-May-2010.pdf.
56. Trio Capital was a superannuation authority that went into voluntary administration on 19
December 2009 and was placed in liquidation on 22 June 2010. See Tehani Goonetilleke,
Obligations and Liabilities of the Key Players in Managed Investment Schemes: Contentious Questions
Arising from Trio Capital, (2011) 29 Co. & SEC. L. J. 419, 420. APRA and ASIC launched an
investigation into Trio Capital relating to alleged fraudulent conduct by using funds received
from Australian investors to fund personal lifestyles and funnel money overseas of
approximately $118 million. See id. (the Trio Capital Inquiry also looked into matters regarding
self-managed superannuation funds, discussed in Part IIIBi).
57. See Inquiry Into the Collapse of Trio Capital, PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORP. &





60. See, e.g., Annual Report, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY AUTH. 62 et seq. (2014),
available at http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Documents/1410-AR-2013-
Full.pdf (APRA provides a detailed discussion on its co-operation and liaison with other
Australian regulators).
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consideration regarding the effectiveness of coordination in the Twin Peaks
Model that the coordination improvements may not address. Under the
Twin Peaks Model, the performance of one regulator may depend on the
performance of another regulator.61 Both the HIH Royal Commission and
the Trio Capital Inquiry were critical of APRA's regulatory response leading
up to the collapses and the inadequate response of APRA in turn had
implications for the effectiveness of ASIC.62 In both instances, APRA was
criticised for not acting promptly in response to warnings of difficulties that
HIH and Trio Capital were experiencing.63 For instance, the HIH Royal
Commission found that despite the mounting evidence of HIH's financial
problems, APRA:
did comparatively little in response. It grappled poorly with the
information in its possession, either failing to recognise its significance
or failing to analyse it thoroughly. It lacked commitment in enforcing
its requests for further information and explanations from HIH. It did
not recognise the seriousness of the situation until it was too late for
effective intervention.64
Although regulators are subject to similar scrutiny under any regulatory
system, the problems may become more acute under the Twin Peaks Model,
which is structured in such a way that each regulator must rely on other
regulators to provide the information and cooperation necessary to allow it
to achieve its own regulatory objectives and to respond in a timely manner.65
The examples considered in this section, therefore, highlight both the
importance of coordination and the potential weakness of the need to rely
on coordination under a functionally based regulatory system where the
regulatory performance of one regulator often depends on the performance
of another functionally separate regulator.
B. SETTING APPROPRIATE BORDERS
Setting the borders of financial regulation can be contentious.66 Policy-
makers and regulators across the globe have grappled with debates on
61. See Rachel Alembakis, Australia's Twin Peaks Regulatory Model Optimal: CIFR, GLOBAL
CUSTODIAN (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.globalcustodian.com/au/news/news article.aspx?id=2 1
47489857#.V3wfVpMrJE4.
62. See HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note 47, at vol. III, 466; Trio Capital Inquiry Report,
supra note 57, at 153.
63. See HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note 47, at vol. I, lii-liii; Trio Capital Inquiry Report,
supra note 57, at 153.
64. HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note 47, at vol. I, lii-liii. The Trio Capital Inquiry
found similar failings with APRA's approach, nothing that "despite having suspicions about the
conduct of the Trio Capital trustees in 2005, it was not until 2009 that APRA issued a 'show
cause' letter and eventually suspended the trustee." Trio Capital Inquiry Report, supra note 57, at
74.
65. See Minter Ellison, supra note 27, at 7-8.
66. See Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 26, at 705.
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whether to broaden financial regulatory protections in response to the
GFC.67 Australia's adoption of the Twin Peaks Model has not meant that
Australia has escaped such border challenges, and Australia's experience with
financial collapses shows that at least two of these challenges persist. The
first border challenge relates to the allocation of regulatory functions
between regulators. The second border challenge, which often follows from
difficulties with the first border challenge,68 is determining which regulatory
tools should be made available to each regulator to enable them to carry out
and perform their functions.
1. Border Challenge One: Allocation of Functions Between Regulators
As with coordination, the HIH collapse once again provides a useful
starting point for examination of this challenge. Importantly for our
purposes, the HIH Royal Commission identified that:
ASIC limited its involvement in HIH's affairs because of a perception
that APRA was responsible for and was in fact closely and effectively
monitoring the situation. ASIC considered that it had little direct
responsibility in relation to prudential regulation of insurers; that was
APRA's role. I am not sure that I agree with this view of allocation of
functions between ASIC and APRA, but I cannot fault ASIC for
assuming that position. It was a view that APRA shared.69
The HIH Royal Commission explained that it did not agree with ASIC
that it should not be concerned with the safety of financial institutions that it
regulates because it was a market conduct regulator rather than a prudential
regulator.70 According to the HIH Royal Commission, ASIC's role in
protecting consumers of financial products could extend to the solvency of
entities providing the financial products.71 Alan Cameron, ASIC's chairman
from 1993 to 2000,72 did not accept this proposition.73 He cited fifty of his
speeches as chairman where he set out his views on the allocation of roles
67. See id. Goodhart and Lastra set out two of what they refer to as "border problems"
relating to international finance: those between regulated and non-regulated entities and those
between states. See id.
68. We have chosen to deal with these two challenges separately as the challenge in allocating
regulatory tools may in some cases not depend on functional division.
69. HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note 47, at vol. I, liv.
70. See id. at 204-05.
71. See id. The HIH Royal Commission outlines ASIC's view that it is not responsible for
ensuring that the claims of policyholders will be paid in the ordinary course of business,
suggesting that it did not have an interest in the financial health of financial services providers.
See id. The HIH Royal Commission was concerned that this approach meant that ASIC would
not be carrying out its consumer protections function in some cases. See id. at 205-06. See also
Jacome & Nier, supra note 44 (discussing how weaknesses in market conduct impacted macro-
systematic risk, which points toward a more significant role for market conduct regulation than
consumer protection alone).
72. See Fellows of Senate, U. OF SYDNEY, http://sydney.edu.au/senate/cameron.shtml (last
visited July 7, 2016).
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between ASIC and APRA, relying on the Wallis Inquiry and second reading
speeches to support his argument that it was not within ASIC's regulatory
mandate to ensure the solvency of entities that it regulated.74 Cameron
complained that if he was wrong about the allocation of functions, no-one
had told him.75 Further, he noted that if the HIH Royal Commission's view
was adopted, ASIC would in effect be acting as Australia's shadow prudential
regulator, a role for which ASIC had not been created.76
This debate between the HIH Royal Commission and ASIC's chairman at
the time that the HIH events took place may seem peculiar in the context of
a regulatory system divided along functional lines; it is often noted that one
of the main benefits of the Twin Peaks Model is its clear division of
regulatory authority between agencies, which suggests that such
disagreements should, in theory, not arise.77 The division means that, by
necessity, on occasion both regulators will need to supervise the same
institution, an inescapable effect of functional regulation.7 The mere fact
that one regulator is engaged in its regulatory or supervisory activities in
relation to a financial institution does not necessarily alleviate the need for
the other regulator to engage in its regulatory functions regarding that
financial institution (and, as we saw in the previous section, coordination
mechanisms may not be a sufficient means by which to avoid this overlap).79
As Mr. Cameron stated, ASIC is not a shadow prudential regulator, but,
equally, APRA is not a shadow market conduct regulator.so
73. Alan Cameron, Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n, Lessons from the HIH Royal
Commission Report, Address to the Australian Institute of Company Directors at 6 June 20,
2003) http://www.cameronralph.com.au/Downloaded%20documents/Cameron%20AICD%20
speech%20on%20HIH.pdf.
74. Id.; see also Greg Medcraft, Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv., Systemic risk: The role of
securities regulators, Speech at Systemic Risk, Basel III, Financial Stability and Regulation
Conference at 3-4 June 28, 2011), http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/speeches/
systemic-risk-the-role-of-securities-regulators/. Medcraft seems to indirectly endorse the more
limited role for ASIC envisaged by Cameron, noting that "many systematic risks arise outside
ASIC's regulatory boundary - for instance, in banking or insurance or real estate or overseas."
See id. (emphasis added).
75. See Cameron, supra note 73, at 6.
76. Id. Cameron noted that in other countries that had taken away prudential regulatory
functions from their central bank, it was the central bank that had acted as a shadow prudential
regulator. See id.
77. See Alembakis, supra note 61.
78. The HIH Royal Commission was of the view that a strong coordination mechanism might
assist with reducing the need for "double-supervision," HIH Royal Commission Report, supra note
47, at vol. I, 205. However, as we noted in Part IIIA, the Australian Twin Peaks Model has
exhibited problems in the area of coordination too and, in some instances, belief in the
effectiveness of coordination mechanisms may lead to problems in a multi-agency system. See
Alembakis, supra note 61.
79. This observation is relevant to the discussion on coordination problems discussed in Part
IIIA.
80. See Cameron, supra note 73, at 6.
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This issue of functional scope has arisen more recently in the debate over
the self-managed superannuation funds (SMSF) sector and whether this
sector should fall within the perimeters of prudential regulation exercised by
APRA.S1 Both the Trio Capital Inquiry and the FSI considered whether
SMSFs should, in light of several controversies relating to provision of
financial advice in this area, be subject to the prudential regulatory authority
of APRA82 or should continue to be regulated primarily by the Australian
Taxation Office (ATO).83 Despite the problems identified as a result of the
collapse of Trio Capital, neither inquiry thought that SMSFs should be
included within APRA's prudential regulatory framework84 The FSI, in
considering prudential regulation of superannuation, noted that "[s]ome
submissions suggest that SMSFs might be prudentially regulated by APRA.
The Inquiry does not support this. The defining characteristic of the SMSF
sector is that trustee members are directly responsible for each fund and
must take responsibility for their own decisions."85
This discussion over whether the SMSF sector should be subject to
prudential regulation illustrates the ongoing debate in defining regulatory
authority and objectives under multi-agency regulatory models that are
organised along functional authority.
81. The Trio Capital Inquiry set out the ATO definition of an SMSF at the time as "a
complying superannuation fund under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 that
has: fewer than five members; each individual trustee of the fund is a member; each member of
the fund is a trustee; no member of the fund is an employee of another member of the fund,
unless those members are related; and if the trustee of the fund is a body corporate each director
of the body corporate is a member of the fund." Trio Capital Inquiry Report, supra note 57, at 12.
The FSI defined SMSFs as "a superannuation fund with fewer than five members, all of whom
are trustees or directors of a corporate trustee," FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 320.
82. See FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 234. In considering the less stringent regulation of
SMSFs, the Trio Capital Inquiry noted that "[SMSFs] are registered with, and overseen by, the
ATO. The ATO's focus is on the SMSF's compliance with superannuation and taxation laws,
not on prudential safeguards. That is, the ATO focuses on ensuring that SMSFs are not used as
vehicles to avoid tax, that the SMSF has an investment strategy and that an independent auditor
verifies annually that its investments have been made in accordance with that strategy. Unlike
APRA-regulated funds, the ATO's role as regulator is not to ensure that the SMSF has
appropriate risk management strategies." See Trio Capital Inquiry Report, supra note 57, at xxiv.
83. Although SMSFs are regulated by the ATO, which is not one of the official "peaks" of the
Twin Peaks Model, the discussion nonetheless illustrates difficulties in allocating regulatory
functions in a multi-agency system like the Twin Peaks Model. See Minter Ellison, supra note
27, at 6-7. In addition, although the Twin Peaks Model is built around the prudential and
market conduct regulators, the regulators involved in financial regulation go beyond the two
official pillars and determining regulatory borders between these regulators has on occasion
proven difficult. See id. (discussing the many regulators involved in the Australian regulatory
system).
84. See FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 234. See also Trio Capital Inquiry Report, supra note
57, at 152. These views supported those of the Wallis Inquiry, which felt that prudential
regulation of SMSFs would be "impracticable," see Wallis Report, supra note 22, at 3 33-34.
85. FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 234.
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2. Border Challenge Two: Allocation of Tools Between Regulators
As the overlap between regulatory functions explored in the previous
section increases, it becomes more difficult to determine which tools should
be available to each regulator to carry out their mandate. The Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services considered issues
regarding allocation of regulatory tools in its inquiry into Financial Products
and Services ("Financial Products and Services Inquiry")86 and its inquiry
into aspects of agribusiness managed investment schemes ("Agribusiness
MIS Inquiry").87 The inquiries discussed whether ASIC should be given the
power to impose capital adequacy requirements on Australian Financial
Services License (AFSL) holders and providers of Agribusiness Managed
Investment Schemes ("Agribusiness MIS").- Both inquiries heard
arguments by submitters for and against the power of ASIC to impose
capital adequacy requirements and, therefore, had to determine on the basis
of these submissions whether the activities in question should be made
subject to requirements that are traditionally associated with APRA's
prudential regulatory role.89
When considering the imposition by ASIC of capital adequacy
requirements on AFSL holders generally, the Financial Products and
Services Inquiry was not convinced "that increased capital adequacy
requirements for licensees would be of overall benefit to consumers.
Although there may be some consumer protection advantages, with large
entities potentially having better capacity to discharge their licensing duties
and meet any compensation claims, any consolidation of the industry away
from smaller boutique advisory firms would not necessarily be in consumers'
interests."90
The Financial Products and Services Inquiry further noted that ASIC was
not a prudential regulator and the cost of AFSL holders being brought
under APRA's regulatory jurisdiction could not be justified.91 These
findings were made in light of ASIC's submission that, despite reviewing the
financial resource requirements for non-APRA regulated AFSL holders,
ASIC is not a prudential regulator and therefore could not set prudential
86. See Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23, at vii.
87. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into
aspects ofagrbusiness managed investment schemes at 1 (Sept. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Agribusiness MIS
Inquiry Report], http://www.aph.gov.au/ParliamentaryBusiness/Committees/Joint/Corpora
tions andFinancialServices/Completedjinquiries/2008-10/MIS/report/index.
88. See generally Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23; see generally
Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87.
89. See Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23, at 153-68 (showing submissions to
the Financial Products and Services Inquiry). See Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87,
at 67-68 (showing submissions to the Agribusiness MIS inquiry).
90. Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23, at 139.
9 1. Id.
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requirements for AFSL holders.92 These findings were largely based on the
premise that prudential supervision was not directed at protecting
consumers. 93 The Financial Products and Services Inquiry did not appear to
consider, however, whether capital adequacy requirements should be
adopted so as to ensure the safety and soundness of important AFSL holders
and ultimately the financial system as a whole.94
The focus of the Inquiry was understandable; the Inquiry was responding
to submissions that sought to confer regulatory powers that were prudential
in nature on ASIC and, as ASIC has stated, it is not a prudential regulator.95
The result of the Inquiry's recommendations, however, was that AFSL
holders would not be subject to capital controls irrespective of the
importance of AFSL holders (or some of them) to the safety and soundness
of the financial system as a whole.96
The recommendations in relation to AFSL holders stand in stark contrast
to those of the Financial Products and Services Inquiry and the Agribusiness
MIS Inquiry that ASIC be given authority to impose capital adequacy
requirements in its regulation of Agribusiness MIS.97 The review of
Agribusiness MIS arose because of several collapses in the industry, most
prominently those of Timbercorp and Great Southern.98 The Agribusiness
MIS Inquiry focused primarily on the role of industry actors in these
collapses,99 but it did have occasion to consider perceived regulatory
problems that may have contributed to the collapses.100 The Agribusiness
MIS Inquiry noted that the entities under review were not subject to
prudential regulation.o1 As with its submission to the Financial Products
and Services Inquiry, ASIC noted that this was because prudential regulation
in Australia is restricted to entities "where the systemic risks and the
92. Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Financial System Inquiry: Submission by
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission at 73-74 (Apr. 4, 2014), http://
download.asic.gov.au/media/1311553/ASIC-submission-to-the-Financial-System-Inquiry-4-
April-2014-1.pdf. ASIC accepted that the fact that it is not a prudential regulation would limit
the type and nature of the financial resource requirements that it could impose on those
overseas. See id. at 143.
93. See Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23, at 139.
94. See id. at 139-40. The line of thinking can be traced back to the Wallis Inquiry, which
held that "[b]eyond deposit taking, systemic risk declines because failure by any one institution
is less likely to generate a run on similar institutions through contagion effects." Wallis Report,
supra note 22, at 304. Although, the Wallis Inquiry did note that more intensive prudential
regulation may also be appropriate for certain capital backed investments and insurance policies.
Id. As Andrew Haldane has noted, however, the GFC illustrated that systemic concerns could
arise from even the most unexpected of sources. See Haldane, supra note 20, at 1.
95. See generally Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 87.
96. See id. at 139-40.
97. Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87, at 47.
98. See id. at 14-16 (discussing the Timbercorp and Great Southern collapses as well as the
state of the Agribusiness MIS industry at the time of the inquiry).
99. See id. at 17.
100. See id. at 37-40.
101. See id. at 3 7.
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intensity of financial promises,102 and hence the risk of market failure, are
greatest," including "authorised deposit-taking institutions, insurers and
superannuation funds, but not managed investment schemes."103
In light of the finding of the Financial Products and Services Inquiry that
ASIC not be given the power to impose capital adequacy requirements on
AFSL holders generally,104 it may have been reasonable to assume that
neither Inquiry would recommend that ASIC be given authority to set
capital adequacy requirements for Agribusiness MIS. But, both the
Agribusiness MIS Inquiry and the Financial Products and Services Inquiry
recommended that ASIC should be authorised to impose capital adequacy
requirements in the case of Agribusiness MIS.105 The Financial Products
and Services Inquiry concluded that:
improving the regulation of financial advice in relation to financial
products is more effective than regulators attempting to ensure,
through additional regulation, that products are 'safe' for investors.
Notwithstanding this and the fact that ASIC is not a prudential
regulator, the committee is of the view that the unique nature of
agribusiness MIS warrant[s] some regulatory intervention to ensure that
these schemes do not, over time, develop a ponzi-like character by
relying on new product sales to prop up existing schemes. Accordingly,
the committee recommends that, as part of their licence conditions,
ASIC require agribusiness MIS licensees to demonstrate they have
sufficient working capital to meet current obligations.106
102. The Wallis Report provides a useful discussion defining financial promises as follows:
Financial contracts play a fundamental role in the efficient functioning of
commerce, facilitating the settlement of trade and channelling resources efficiently
across time and space. The basic elements of financial contracts are promises -
promises to make payments at specified times, in specified amounts and in specified
circumstances. Financial arrangements which take the form of trust relationships
also involve promises - promises to manage assets in the best interests of
beneficiaries.
Financial promises are among those products and services which incorporate risk,
including the risk that the promise will not be kept.
The financial system provides the framework within which these promises are
created and exchanged. Unlike the markets for most other goods and services, the
exchange of many financial contracts takes into account both the explicit contractual
promise and the varying risk that the promise will not be kept. Identifying,
allocating and pricing risk is a key role of the financial system.
Wallis Report, supra note 22, at 179.
103. Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87, at 37 (quoting Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, PJC Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia: Submission
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission at 19 (Aug. 2009), http://
download.asic.gov.au/media/1311547/ASIC-submission-PJC-Financial-Products-and-Services-
Inquiry-2009.pdf.).
104. See Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 87, at 139.
105. See id. at 140; Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87, at 47.
106. Financial Products and Services Report, supra note 23, at 140.
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Although ultimately deferring the decision on capital adequacy
requirements to the Financial Products and Services Inquiry, the
Agribusiness MIS Inquiry agreed that "MIS providers should be required to
demonstrate that they have sufficient working capital to meet the financial
commitments they incur from existing schemes and new MIS sales, without
being dependent on further, additional new sales for their viability."o7
The recommendation to provide ASIC with authority to set capital
requirements for Agribusiness MIS followed similar moves in 2009 resulting
from the transfer of authority for regulating financial markets from the
financial markets themselves to ASIC.os This transfer of regulatory
authority included the right to impose capital requirements on financial
market participants.109 Although the right to impose capital controls on
financial markets appears to have largely been a by-product of the desire to
transfer regulatory authority from industry actors to a government
authority,io along with the Agribusiness MIS example, it signifies an
increased willingness by reformers to provide ASIC with the ability to use
the traditionally prudential regulatory tool of imposing capital requirements
on those it regulates.
107. Agribusiness MIS Inquiry Report, supra note 87, at 47.
108. See Press Release, Chris Bowen, Reforms to the Supervision of Australia's Financial
Markets (Aug. 24, 2009), http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/
2009/013.htm&pagelD=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType.
109. ASIC has produced Market Integrity Rules in the exercise of its regulatory duties. See
Market integrity rules, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM'N, http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/
markets/market-integrity-rules/ (last visited July 6, 2016). In relation to capital requirements,
ASIC has, for instance, produced Regulatory Guide 226. See Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, Guidance on ASIC market integrity rules for capital and related
requirements: ASX, ASX 24, Chi-X and APX markets (Aug. 2013), http://download.asic.gov.au/
media/3549330/rg226-published-24-february-2016.pdf. ASIC has largely replicated capital
requirements that had been imposed by financial markets before their transfer, with the
exception of two changes made to requirements for daily reconciliations of client money and
lodgment by non-clearing ASX 24 market participants of monthly capital returns within ten
business days (rather than one month) after the end of each calendar month. See Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, Response to submissions on CP 161 Proposed ASIC market
integrity rules for capital and related requirements: ASX, ASX 24 and Chi-X Markets at 4 (Aug. 1,
2011), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1343660/rep244-published-1-August-2011.pdf. See
also Martha Ware, ASIC makes rules for capital and related requirements for ASX and ASX 24
markets, LEXISNEXIs AUSTL. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.lexisnexis.com.au/blogs/corporations-
law/post/asic-makes-rules-for-capital-and-related-requirements-for-asx-and-asx-24-
markets.aspx.
110. In announcing the transfer of regulatory authority to ASIC, the government did not refer
to the ability to impose capital requirements as a motivating factor. See Press Release, Bowen,
supra note 108. Instead, Minister Bowen stated that "[a]s part of the Government's drive to
improve regulation of the financial industry, the Government has decided to transfer
supervisory responsibility for Australia's financial markets to ASIC as it is more appropriate for
an agency of the Government to perform this important function." See id.
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IV. Conclusion
Although the Twin Peaks Model has evolved throughout the past fifteen
years in response to collapses and other problems, the challenges set out in
Part III can be traced back to the recommendations by the Wallis Inquiry
regarding financial regulation. The Wallis Inquiry, emphasising a desire to
minimise the cost and impact of regulation on financial markets,"' identified
certain financial activities that at the time were thought to require more
intense regulation (prudential regulation) because of their potential impact
on financial safety.112 In accordance with this view, the Australian Twin
Peaks Model continues (on an institutional basis) to subject Australian
deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies, and superannuation funds
to the more intense prudential regulatory authority of APRA, whilst ASIC
provides specific market conduct and consumer protection regulation for the
financial system." 3
Where other jurisdictions, spurred on by the perceived regulatory
deficiencies identified in their financial systems as a result of the GFC, have
engaged in comprehensive reform of regulation, Australian reformers have
been less willing to disturb the balance in regulation established by the
Wallis Inquiry. The FSI reaffirmed the division of regulatory functions in a
manner similar to the Wallis Inquiry as follows:
The core mandates of the regulators are generally clear. APRA is
responsible for maintaining financial stability; protecting the claims of
authorised deposit-taking institution depositors and insurance policy-
holders; and promoting prudent management of non-SMSF
superannuation funds. ASIC is responsible for consumer protection
and market integrity. The RBA and Payments System Board (PSB) are
responsible for financial stability and controlling risk in the financial
system. Each regulator is required to balance these core responsibilities
against other objectives, including promoting competition and
efficiency, maximising business certainty and minimising compliance
costs.114
This paper has illustrated that despite this relatively clear division of
functions amongst Australia's key financial regulators, the Twin Peaks Model
continues to face regulatory challenges in certain areas. The first challenge
relates to the coordination mechanisms between Australia's key financial
regulators. Although reforms have been made to address challenges
identified through collapses such as HIH and Trio Capital, there continues
111. See Wallis Report, supra note 22, at 177-78, 188-95.
112. Id. at 192.
113. Id. at 298. As discussed in Part IIIB, in addition to the official Twin Peaks Model agencies,
other financial regulators, such as the ATO, also play an important role in financial regulation
in Australia. See Minter Ellison, supra note 27, at 6-7.
114. FSI Final Report, supra note 15, at 241. But the FSI does note that there are some
inconsistencies in how non-core objectives are framed in relation to APRA and ASIC and
whether some of the objectives apply at all. See id.
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to be a preference for informal bilateral and multilateral coordination
mechanisms over formal, statute-based mechanisms."5 Where coordination
has been identified as a problem, regulators have responded by enhancing
MoUs and establishing informal information-sharing measures to make sure
that each regulator is aware of the role of other regulators in the system.
Although it is too early to identify whether the latest measures implemented
in response to the Trio Capital collapse will be effective in resolving
coordination challenges, it is likely that the regulators will continue to face
the difficulty inherent in a multi-agency regulatory structure such as the
Twin Peaks Model where the performance of one regulator is often
dependent on that of the other regulator.
The second challenge is that of establishing the borders of financial
regulation. The example of HIH showed challenges faced by regulators in
determining the scope of their regulatory functions. In particular, the
uncertainty over ASIC's role, which the HIH Royal Commission believed
could include regulation of the safety and soundness of institutions,
highlights the challenge relating to the allocation of functions between
regulators. The more recent example of SMSF illustrates the ongoing and
broader application of this challenge as debate continues over where the
prudential perimeters should be set. It appears that the general trend in
determining appropriate functional borders has been to leave in place the
official regulatory divisions but to expand ASIC's regulatory scope so that its
regulatory objectives overlap with, or at least are supportive of, APRA's
objectives and the need to achieve systemic stability and effective
macroprudential regulation generally. There has also been debate regarding
the regulatory tools that ASIC should have and whether these should include
tools that have traditionally been associated with prudential regulation, such
as the power to impose capital requirements.
115. See, e.g., Luci Ellis, Head of Fin. Stability Department, Reserve Bank of Austl.,
Macroprudential Policy: A Suite of Tools or a State of Mind?, Speech at Paul Woolley Centre
for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality Annual Conference (Oct. 11, 2012), http://
www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-so-111012.html. In discussing coordination and systemic
risk, Ellis notes that:
It comes down to the relationship between the agencies and the culture of the
supervisor to create that willingness. There doesn't need to be a so-called systemic
risk regulator issuing public warnings or directions, telling the supervisor what to
do. Some jurisdictions might want to set things up that way, but there are other
ways that might be better here. In Australia, we think that a culture of cooperation,
dialogue and mutual respect is more important than formalised arrangements. The
Council of Financial Regulators has proved itself to be a low-cost, flexible way of
coordinating between agencies, alongside bilateral relationships. We think we have
the essential elements needed to promote financial stability with a holistic frame of
mind. In the end, what is needed is the wisdom to see the problems and the
willingness to act in response. No elaborate set of institutional arrangements and
rules can manufacture those two things.
Id.
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The challenges explored in this paper provide an opportunity to reflect on
Australia's current regulatory framework and its relative strengths and
weaknesses. Although Australia did not experience the same negative effects
from the GFC as many other jurisdictions, it is important to review the
regulatory framework to ensure that it meets the needs of Australia's
evolving financial system. The analysis is also useful in highlighting these
challenges so that foreign jurisdictions considering implementing a model
similar to the Twin Peaks Model are aware of the potential challenges that
may arise under such a model.
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